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THE SEARCH FOR DUE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL
WELFARE PROGRAMS
JOHN

A.

DOOLEY

III*

AND
JOSEPH GOLDBERG"

I.

INTRODUCTION

To an ever increasing extent, it is becoming recognized that the
legal problems of the poor' are distinct from the legal problems

attendant to other socio-economic classes.2 While it is not difficult
to recognize that this distinction exists, it is difficult to articulate

precisely how these legal problems differ and the reasons why they
differ. The answers to these latter two questions may be found in

the fact that the poor come into continuing contact with governmental
officials and agencies more than other socio-economic groups. In
addition to, this quantitative distinction, the quality of the poor's contact with officials and agencies is markedlyv different from those of
other g.oups.3
More than any other group, the poor rely on the governmentfederal, state and local-for the basic necessities to maintain -a
* Assistant Director, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc.; B.S., Union College, 1965; L.I2B.
Boston College, 1968.
**
Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota; A.B., Trinity College,
1965; L.L.B. Boston College, 1968.
1. There is, of course, no clear definition of "poor." For the purposes of this article,
"poor" can be defined as at least those persons who are eligible for 'governmental income
assistance programs. For a good discussion of the attempts at defining "poor" and the
lack of success thereof, see H. Harrington,"The Betrayal of the Poor," THi ATLAN'TC 71
(January 1970).
2. "Because the law applicable to the poor, as thus defined, proves to be, today, no
less than in earlier times, In large measure a special law, consisting of rules and procedures applicable to the poor as a distinct class, we have come to speak of it as the law
of the poor." J. TENBROEK, THE LAW OF THE POOR, vii (1966). Law schools are now proliferating with courses directed at "the law of the poor." This fact is reflected by the introduction of many new casebooks directed at the legal problems of the poor, e.g., P.
DODYK, et. al., LAW AND POVERTY (1969) ; H. KsrPKZ, CONSUMER CREDrr (1970); J. K ASNOwIEKi, HOUSINO AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

(1969); and the expansion of the coverage of

these problems in new revisions of existing materials. Compare A. CASNHE & W. LACH,
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY, Part VII (let ed. 1950) with A. CAsNES & W. LEAcH,
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY, Part VI (2nd ed. 1969).

3. Concededly, other definable socio-economlc groups come into continuing contact
with governmental agencies. Thus, the railroad executive may come into constant contact
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the television executive with the Fedral
Communications Commission, and so on. However, those individuals deal with the agencies
and officials with the ability to marshall economic resources and expert assistance that
the poor do not have.
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minimum level of existence. It is not uncommon for a poor person
to depend upon governmental largess for his basic source of income; 4
for habitation;5 for medical care; 8 for food;7 for job training,
counseling and guidance; S and for legal assistance. 9 These programs, upon which the poor rely to such a great extent,1 0 intrudes
the government-and with it, the myriad of governmental officials
who administer the programs-into the very core of the person's
life. Moreover, these programs lack any meaningful coordination,
so that in the course of a day, it would be possible for a poor person
to see one or more different officials in regard to each of these
programs.1 1
From the foregoing, it can be seen that, to a large extent,
the quality of life for many poor persons is determined by the nature
of his contacts with government administrators. It is, of course,
fundamental that when the government acts in a way that affects
its citizens, the way in which it may permissably act is circum4. Generally, income assistance programs fall into two broad classes: (1) those
"categorical assistance" programs funded and administered cooperatively by the state and
federal governments, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq., 601 et. seq., 1201 St. seq., 1351 St.
seq. (1964), and those programs administered and funded by the states alone, e.g., N.Y.
Soc. SzRv. LAW §§ 157-166 (McKlnney Supp. 1970). There are four categorical assistance
programs, defined by reference to the groups eligible to receive the income assistance
benefits: (1) Old Age Assistance (OAA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq. (1964) ; (2) Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et. seq. (1964); Aid
to the Blind (AB), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et. seq. (1964); Aid to the Permanently and
Totally Disabled (APTD), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351 et. seq. (1964). The definition of income
assistance programs can of course, be expanded, to include other governmental assistance
programs such as the Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
(OASDI), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1964); or unemployment compensation programs
jointly funded and administered by the federal and state governments, see 42 U.S.C. 66
1101 et seq. (1964).
5. Both states and federal governments have many programs which provide housing
to the poor, either through producing housing that will be rented to poor persons at low
rentals, see e.g., Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 passim
(Supp. V 1964 ed.), or through rent supplements, see 42 U.S.C. J 421 b (Supp. V 1964 ed.)
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (Supp. V 1964 ed.); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (Supp.
V 1964 ed.)
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (Supp. V 1964 ed.). See 7 C.F.R. 66 1600 et seq.
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 630 et seq. (Supp. V 1964 ed.).
9. See Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. 66 2781 et seq. (Supp. V 1964 ed.).
10. See Dodyk, et al, supra note 2 at 1-10.
11. As if this were not enough, these programs constitute such an administrative and
bureaucratic labyrinth as to seriously impair the chance of effective and fair administration. There are at least six different income maintenance programs (and more, if one expands the definition) which are administered either by the states alone; the federal government alone; or the states and federal government together. The number of different
housing programs stretches well into the hundreds. These programs are administered by
both state and federal governments, either independently or together. Just as to the fedral housing programs, they are administered by two separate federal agencies, operating
under authority vested through at least eight different statutes. There are at least three
separate food supplement programs, administered by two different federal agencies, in
conjunction with state agencies.
The plethora of these programs, together with their attendant regulations (or lack
of regulations), has created an "Alice-in-Wonderland" world leading to confusing and
ridiculous situations. Thus, the procedure by which a resident of a public housing project
may be evicted from his apartment may be determined solely on the basis of whether
the project was built with federal financial assistance or not. Compare Thorpe v. Housing
Auth'y of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) with McIntyre v. Housing Auth'y of Norwich,
Civ. No. 13054 (D. Conn., May 14, 1969). Recently, it has come to light that the federal
Department of Agriculture, which funds the Food Stamp program, neglected for some six
months to inform some of the state agencies administering the program of a new regulation governing eligibility.
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scribed by those norms and standards which we have come to call
"Due Process of Law". 1 2 It is necessary that the action of administrators in reference to the poor be constantly measured against
definable and articulated due process standards, since their actions
affect the fundamentals of existence for the poor. This is especially
true when it is considered that the poor are uniquely less able than
others to challenge possibly arbitrary and unfair administrative
actions.
In the past few years, the United States Supreme Court and
lower federal and state courts have addressed themselves to defining
due process standards in this area of the law. 18 It is the purpose of
this article to describe the recent attempts of the courts to define
these standards in one small subdivision of poverty law: The administration of income maintenance programs. First, there will be a
discussion of the case in which the Supreme Court addressed itself
to this problem, and an analysis of the approach adopted by the
Court in that case. Finally, there will be a discussion of some of the
problems left unresolved by the Supreme Court's decision.
II.

THE CASE

4

In Goldberg v. Kelly,1 the Supreme Court struck down New
York's procedure for the termination of income assistance program
benefits, as a deprivation of property without due process of law.
While the Kelly case involved only one aspect of the procedure involved in the administration of one of many governmental benefit
programs, the implications of the Court's decision are broad and
extend beyond the facts of the instant case. On the other hand, the
rationale employed by the Court in reaching its decision leaves many
questions unanswered concerning the application of the standard
applied in Kelly to other procedures and other programs.
The plaintiffs in Kelly were recipients of income assistance benefits under the cooperative federal-state program of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) 16 or under New York State's own
income assistance program, Home Relief.1 6 Each of the plaintififs
had been terminated from assistance or had been threatened with
termination. Alleging that the procedures employed in these terminations violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend12. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1.
13. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969): Thorpe v. Housing Auth'y of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) ; Williams v. Schaffer, 385 U.S. 1037

(1967) ; New York City Housing Authority v.

425 F.2d 853 (2d. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 39 U.S.L.W.
14.

397

U.S.

254

(1970).

This case

was decided

Escalera,

3139 (October 13, 1970).
together

with

a

companion

case,

Wheeler v Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1964 ed.) ; N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 433-62 (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
16. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 157-66 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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ment, the plaintiffs filed suits in the United States District Court
and sought the convocation of a three judge district court 17 to consider the constitutionality of these procedures.
At the time the action was commenced, applicable regulations
to both AFDC and Home Relief provided for no notice or opportunity
to be heard prior to termination.' 8 The terminated recipient was
provided with an opportunity to be heard, designated a "Fair Hearing," only after the termination of assistance had been effected.
However, after suit was filed, but before any decision was rendered,
New York amended its regulations to provide for new procedures
relative to the termination of AFDC and Home Relief. 9 Pursuant
to these new regulations, two alternative procedures were offered
to local agencies administering the programs to elect at their discretion. Under alternative (a), before a recipient could be terminated
from assistance, he would have to receive notice, at least seven days
prior to the proposed termination, specifying reasons for the termination. In addition, the recipient, would have to be provided with an
opportunity, if he so desired, to appear before an administrative
official of higher rank than the one proposing termination. At this
"administrative hearing," the recipient would be able to present
oral or written evidence and could be represented by an attorney
or lay representative. It is only after these procedures had been
followed, and there was concurrence by the reviewing official in
the termination, that termination could be effected.
Under alternative (b), the recipient would also be provided with
notice at least seven days prior to the proposed termination. There
would also be an opportunity for pre-termination review by a superior
administrative official. However, rather than a personal appearance
before the reviewing official, the recipient would be entitled only to
submit a written statement to the administrator, stating why assistance should not be discontinued. Under both alternatives, there remained the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing after termination, regardless whether or not the recipient invoked the pre-termination procedures. The local agency which was administering
relief to the plaintiffs in Kelly elected to adopt alternative (b) .20
A three judge district court was convened 2' and the court, addressing itself to the newly amended procedures, found alternative
(b) to be constitutionally deficient, but found alternative (a) to meet
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1964 ed.).
18. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd. sub. nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 264 (1970).
19. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.26.
20. All of the plaintiffs in Kelly were from New York City. The rest of the state
adopted alternative (a).
21. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause. 22 The govern28
ment appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan framed
the issue in the following manner:
The question for decision is whether a State which terminates
public assistance payments to a particular recipient without
affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior
to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in
violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend24
ment.

In reaching the conclusion that the procedures set forth in alternative
(b) of the New York regulations were constitutionally deficient,2 5
the Court had to answer three distinct questions: (1) Does the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to procedures
used in the administration of governmental "gratuities" like public
assistance; (2) Do Due Process considerations require a hearing
prior to the effectation of administrative action; and (3) Do the procedures propounded by New York in alternative (b) meet the constitutional minimums.
A.

The Right-Privilege Distinction

In holding that the Due Process Clause applies to the administration of such public assistance programs as AFDC, the Supreme
Court apparently has laid to rest a troublesome doctrine that has
arisen in the course of the judicial development of due process.
Known as the "Right-Privilege Distinction, ' ' 26 this doctrine reasons
that due process requirements attach only to substantial interests
in which a claimant has a personal or property right and do not
extend to mere privileges or gratuities extended by the government.
Under the application of this doctrine, unless a claimant could assert
a "right" to the interest that has been denied him, he would not
27
be heard to complain about the procedure by which he was denied.
28
While the vitality of this doctrine has been waning in recent years,
it has continued to plague courts and litigants up to the present.
22.

294 F.

Supp. at 906-07. Technically, alternative (a)

was not in

issue, since all the

plaintiffs were being administered under alternative (b), but the district court ruled as to
alternative (a) "because argument has also been addressed to the legal sufficiency at the
provisions of option (a)
and
need to substitute for option
tutionality of the procedures
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253
24. 397 U.S. at 255.

25.

because New York will be faced under our ruling with the
(b), we feel it is our obligation also to consider the constiunder option (a)." Id. at 906.
(1964 ed.).

The Supreme Court specifically refused to pass on the constitutionality of alterna-

tive (a), thereby leaving its legal validity in doubt. Id. at 257 n. 3.
26. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968) ; Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior
Hearing, 76 YA.LE L. J. 1234, 1237-39 (1967); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J.
733 (1964).
27. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ; U.S. ex. rel. Knauff
v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).

28. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1959). Compare U.S. ex. rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, supra note 27, with Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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In Kelly, the Court clearly rejected the argument that because
the assistance benefits in question could be labeled a "privilege"
rather than a "right," due process considerations were not applicable. 29 While the Court rejected the "Right-Privilege Distinction,"
as a criteria for determining whether the Due Process Clause applied
at all, it did note that the nature of the interest involved was a factor
in determining what procedures would meet due process standards. 80
B.

Pre-Termination Hearing

Once the Court established that the procedures by which income
assistance benefits were to be terminated would have to be measured
against due process standards, it next had to determine whether
due process standards required that a hearing take place prior
to termination. The answer to this question depended considerably
on the standard the Court adopted. For the Court to have held that
the Due Process Clause inflexibly required an administrative hearing
prior to the effectation of administrative action would have required
the Court to overrule or substantially undermine a well established
line of decisions upholding administrative action without any sort
of prior hearing.3 ' Moreover, to have articulated such an inflexible
rule would have cast substantial doubt on a wide variety of practices
where the government acts to affect the interests of its citizens
without affording a prior hearing. Thus, in eminent domain proceedings, it has long been established that the government may exercise
its right to eminent domain and take property with no prior hearing
on the taking, deferring any hearing until after the taking has been
accomplished. 82 It is equally well established that the government
may sieze contraband without first affording a prior hearing.8 8 Indeed, even a person's interest in his liberty does not necessarily
warrant a hearing prior to his liberty being restrained."
In an effort not to disturb these sanctioned practices, Justice
Brennan adopted a balancing test to determine what procedures
will meet the minimums of due process:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient [of a governmental benefit] is influenced by the
extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'
. . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in
29. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
30. Id. See also McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F.Supp. 268, 272 (D. Conn. 1968), afrd, 416
F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969).
31. E.g. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) ; North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
32. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895).
33. United States v. Herzfeld, 271 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34. See Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) ; Rheingans v. Clark, 214 F. Supp. 1898
(N.D. Calif- 1968).
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avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. 3
By employing such a balancing test, the Court could determine
that a pre-termination hearing was required in this situation without
disturbing the established precedents and practices.
In applying the balancing test to the interests involved, the
Court found the recipients' interest in retaining the benefits while
awaiting a hearing to determine the correctness of the proposed
termination to far outweigh the governmental interests promoted by
withholding benefits pending a hearing. In characterizing the recipients' interests, the Court pierced through the label of the income
assistance benefit as a "gratuity" or "privilege" and found that the
benefits provided "the recipient [with] the very means by which
to live ....,,6 Describing this interest as a "brutal need" 37 for assist-

ance, the Court framed the interests of the recipients in continued
assistance pending hearing as the interest in survival. To deprive
the recipient of this interest would adversely affect the recipient's
ability to seek redress and would substantially impair the "important
governmental interests"3' 8 of fostering the dignity and well-being
of its citizens.
The Court could discern only one substantial governmental interest
in withholding benefits pending a hearing: that of "conserving fiscal
and administrative time and energy." 39 In resolving the balance
of interests in favor of the recipients' continued receipt of benefits
pending hearing, the Court stated:
Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted
receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest
that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase
in its fiscal and administrative burdens. As the District Court
correctly concluded, '[t]he stakes are simply too high for
the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or
irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid
without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be
fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest
its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal.'40

C. The Type of Hearing
In determining that due process required that assistance benefits
not be terminated until the recipient had an opportunity to determine
the "correctness" of the proposed termination, it remained for
the Court to determine whether the pre-termination "hearing" af35.
$6.
37.
38.
39.
40.

397
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. at 263.
at 264.
at 261.
at 264.
at 265.
at 266.
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forded the recipients by the State of New York under alternative
(b) was sufficient to ascertain the correctness of the proposed termination. Thus, the Court stated:
Accordingly, the pre-termination hearing has one function
only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of
the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect
a recipient against an erroneous
41
termination of benefits.
Against this standard, it was the failure of the adopted procedures
to allow recipients an opportunity to present oral testimony and to
confront witnesses that was "fatal to the constitutional adequacy of
4' 2
the procedures.
As to the opportunity to present oral testimony, the Court noted
that to a welfare recipient, often with a limited educational background, written submissions were unrealistic as a method of adequately presenting the recipient's position. The Court appeared to
regard as important the interplay between the recipient and the
decision-maker which oral testimony provides. 43 As to the opportunity
for confrontation of witnesses, the Court noted that such confrontation is necessary to adequately test the memory of witnesses or to
uncover reasons for perjury or otherwise undermine the credibility
of witnesses."
There were three dissents to the Court's decision. Justice Stewart,
while noting that "the question for me is a close one,"' 45 merely
stated, without benefit of discussion, that he did not consider the
New York procedures constitutionally inadequate. He did not state
whether he thought this was because the Due Process Clause rights
did not attach to the interests involved or whether he would have
struck the balance in another direction. Chief Justice Burger, in
an opinion heavily laden with overtones of "anticipatory mootness,"
questioned the propriety of reaching the constitutional issues, since
the federal government had issued a new regulation which required
that benefits be continued until there was a complete hearing. Although the regulation would not take effect until several months
after the decision,'46 the Chief Justice did not address himself to how
the announced regulation would have an affect on the plaintiffs in
41. Id. at 267.
42. Id. at 268.
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 270. The Court further required that the decision be made on the record,
written reasons be given and the hearing office be impartial. The Court further held that
the recipient had a right to be represented by counsel, but curiously, -did not hold that
counsel had to be provided free of charge for persons unable to retain counsel. Compare
35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (May 29, 1970).
45. 397 U.S. at 285.
46. Id. at 283. Interestingly, this regulation, which was originally intended to go into
effect in July, 1970, see 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1970), has been revoked, see 35 Fed. Reg.
8448 (May 29, 1970), and a somewhat different regulation was proposed. At the time of
the publication of this article, the "newly-proposed" regulation has not been acted upon,
and no regulation is in effect.
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Kelly, and if not, how its existence was therefore relevant to
the issues.
It was Justice Black, in his dissent, who addressed himself to
the issues and the majority's handling of the issues. Justice Black's
differences with the majority were more fundamental than whether
the majority had correctly identified the proper interests of the
parties or had struck the proper balance of those interests. Black's
dissatisfaction was with the approach adopted by the majority of
the Court: that of balancing the recipients' interests against the
government's. Attacking what he characterized as the "collective
conscience ' 47 approach to due process, Black stated:
Today's balancing act requires a 'pre-termination evidentiary
hearing,' yet there is nothing that indicates what tomorrow's
balance will be. Although the majority attempts to bolster
its decision with limited quotations from prior cases, it is obvious that today's result does not depend on the language of
the Constitution itself or the principles of the other decisions,
but solely on the collective judgment of the majority as to
what would be a fair and' humane procedure in this case. 48
Black further expressed doubt as to whether a recipient's interest
in continued income assistance benefits rose to the level of a right
that should be afforded procedural protection under the Due Process
Clause:
The Court, however, relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment
and in effect says that the failure of government to pay a
promised charitable instalment (sic) to an individual deprives
that individual of his own property, in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It somewhat
strains credulity to say that a government's promise of charity
to an individual is property belonging to that individual when
individual is honestly entitled to
government denies that the
49
receive such a payment.
It is easier to understand Justice Black's dissent if the reader
recognizes that Black perceived ominous "Substantive Due Process"
overtones in the majority's decision. That Black viewed the majority's approach as bordering on a "substantive due process" approach
is indicated by his several references to the majority's opinion as
"judicial legislation ' ' 50 and his statement:
I regret very much to be compelled to say that the Court
today makes a drastic and dangerous departure from a Constitution written to control and limit the government and the
judges and moves toward a constitution designed to be no more
and no less than what the judges of a particular social and eco47.
397 U.S. at 276 n. 6. In another context, Justice Black has labeled this approach
as a return to "natural law." Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 351 (1969)
(Black, J., Dissenting).
397 U.S. at 276.
48.
49. Id. at 275 (emphasis in the original).
50. Id. at 273-74, 275, 279. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra note 47 at 351.
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nomic philosophy declare on the one hand to be fair or on the
other hand to be shocking and unconscionable. 51
Viewed in this light, Justice Black's dissatisfaction with an approach
by the majority which he views as dangerously similar to a doctrine
he has traditionaly rejected 2 becomes clear. Indeed, his position
becomes consistent with his well established "incorporation" theory
that the substance of the Due Process Clause is limited to no more
and no less than applying the guarantees set forth in the Bill of
58
Rights to the states.
While Justice Black's dissent in Kelly may be viewed as consistent
with his established "incorporation" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is quite clear that the Justice is fighting a losing battle
on the Court and that the balancing approach, at least as to procedural
due process, is well established.- Even if the balancing approach
is accepted, however, the majority opinion should not escape criticism. In identifying the recipients' interest involved, the Court noted
the recipients' "brutal need" and defined their interest as the interest
in survival. Nowhere in the Court's opinion, however, is there any
factual inquiry or exposition of the circumstances of the recipients
to determine whether they were, in fact, in "brutal need" of continued assistance for survival. This is not to say that in every pretermination hearing case that comes before a court, the court must
first determine whether the particular recipient is in "brutal need"
of continued assistance.5 5 However, in the first such case, if the
Court is to set forth a rule of somewhat general applicability, it is
submitted that the Court has a responsibility to establish the facts
which support the underlying basis for its decision.
The Court's decision is also open to criticism in its failure to
define the extent of the application of the rule that it adopts. 8 The
majority opinion failed to indicate whether the requirement of a
pre-termination hearing is to apply to all situations where income
assistance benefits are being terminated or whether there may be
some termination situations in which a prior hearing is not required.
Moreover, the Court failed to state whether the pre-termination
hearing requirement is limited to "terminations" or whether the
rule applies equally to suspensions, reductions and other modifica51. 397 U.S. at 277.
52. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947); Sniadach v. Faimily Finance Corp. supra note 47 at 351; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
53. "In my Judgment, [the] history [of the Fourteenth Amendment] conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as
a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the people, and by those
opposed to its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could
deprive its citizens of the privilege and protection of the Bill of Eights." Adamson V. California, eupra note 52 at 74-75. See P. FauwD, et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASa AND
OTESS PaOBLEMs, 1320-1339 (3d ed. 1967).
54.. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., eupra note 47.
55. The district court did go into an extended exposition of the factual circumstances
of the recipients. See 294 F. Supp. at 899-900.
66. See general/y, With the Editors, 83 HARV. L. EV. vii (No. 4, February, 1970).
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tions of income assistance benefits. Finally, the Court failed to
indicate whether the requirement is limited to income assistance
benefits or could be extended to other governmental assistance programs such as housing, medical or food assistance. The failure of
the Court to address itself to these considerations has left the Kelly
decision shrouded in an ambiguity with which the lower federal and
state courts are presently struggling. 57 The remainder of this article
will be devoted to developing some standards for defining the extent
of the applicability of the Kelly decision, drawing heavily on the
experience of the lower federal and state courts in dealing with
these questions.
III.

THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

A. The Application of the Requirement to All Terminations
The first area left unresolved by the Court in Kelly is whether
the pre-termination hearing requirement applies to all terminations
of income assistance benefits or whether there are some terminations
which do not require prior hearings. Put in other terms, the question
involves the application of the requirement of a pre-termination
hearing when the circumstances depart from the precise factual
situation presented in Kelly. While read broadly, Kelly may be inter5
preted as creating a prior hearing requirement in all terminations,"
there are two factors which cast doubt on an uncritically broad
reading of the case. First, there is lanquage in the case which appears to leave open the question whether the prior hearing requirement applies where the recipient attacks the legal, rather than the
factual, basis for the termination. 59 Second, the Court's heavy reliance on the basis for its prior hearing requirement-the "brutal
need" of recipients for continued assistance in order to maintain
minimum levels of existence-raises the question of the applicability
of the requirement where it is clear that such a "brutal need" is
not present in the case.
1. The "Law-Fact" Distinction. While the Supreme Court did
not go into extended analysis of the facts involved in the Kelly case,
the district court's opinion makes it clear that the plaintiffs were
attacking the factual bases upon which their assistance had been
terminated. 60 Thus, the Supreme Court was not presented with a
situation where there was no dispute between the recipient and the
administrative agency as to the facts, but the recipient was attacking
the legal foundation of the termination, i.e., attacking the legal
57. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Burson, CCH Pov. L. Rep. % 11,836 (N.D.Ga. 1970).
58. See 397 U.S. 264: "But we agree with the District Court that when welfare I
discontinued, only a pre-terminatlon evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process."
59. See 397 U.S. at 268 n. 15.
60. See 294 F. Supp. at 899-900.
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validity of the statute or regulation pursuant to which the department was effecting the termination. In describing the type of hearing
required by the Due Process Clause, the Court noted that "[tihis
case presents no question requiring our determination whether due
process requires only an opportunity for written submissions, or an
opportunity for written submissions and oral argument, where there
is no factual issue in dispute or where the application of the rule
of law is not intertwined with factual issues." 1
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare 2 and several
states 8 have chosen to interpret the qualifying language quoted
above as indicating that the Kelly prior hearing requirement can
be limited to cases involving factual disputes and have issued regulations limiting the pre-termination hearing to cases "involving an
issue of fact, or of judgment relating to the individual case."' 64 The
state of Vermont has issued a regulation which specifically states
that a request for a hearing on a proposed termination "which indicates only that the recipient seeks to challenge the legality of the
regulation under which the [social] worker acted

. . .

does not give

rise to a right to a continuation of benefits" 5
The lower federal and state courts which have been presented
with this question have divided on the issue. 68 In Merriweather
8 7 the plaintiffs brought a class action seeking a declarav. Burson,
tion that the State of Georgia must provide a prior hearing in all
cases of termination, regardless of whether the dispute is factual or
legal. The district court held that the requirement of a pre-termination hearing applied only where there was a factual dispute. In
reaching this result, the court relied heavily on the type of hearing
the Supreme Court described in Kelly as necessary to meet minimum due process standards:
The function of the pre-termination hearing [as described
in Goldberg v. Kelly] is to produce an initial determination
of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuing payment of benefits. .

.

.Part II of the Supreme

Court's opinion makes clear that the High Court had in mind
the department's factual grounds for discontinuing payments.
The aspects of due process which the Supreme Court stressed
were those constituting the procedural safeguards surrounding the administrative resolution of a factual controversy:
notice, an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and
61.
62.

897 U.S. at 268 n. 15.
See 46 C.F.RL § 205.10 (b) (1970).
See, e.g., Vt. Department of Social Welfare, General Manual § 1619 (Sept. 4, 1970).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (a).
65. Vt. Department of Social Welfare, General Manual § 1619 (Sept. 4, 1970). Thin
regulation is presently under attack in a suit filed soon after its promulgation. Provost
v. Betit, Civ. No. 6091 (D. Vt., complaint filed Nov. 9, 1970).
66. Compare Merriweather v. Burson, CCH Pov. L. Rep. ff 11,836 (N.D.Ga. 1970) with
Robertson v. Born, CCH Pov. ". Rep. 1 10,253 (N.D.Cal. 1969).
67. CCH Pov. L. Rep. 1 11,386 (N.D.Ga, 1970).
E9.
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to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. . . Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the hearing need not
include the one procedural safeguard most important in resolving legal, rather than factual controversies-the right to
counsel.6
While the court, in Merriweather, correctly noted that the type
of hearing described in Kelly appears to be directed at safeguarding
correct factual determinations, that factor alone is not persuasive
that the pre-termination hearing requirement applies only to cases
involving factual disputes. As discussed in Part II of this article,
the Supreme Court, in Kelly, first decided whether due process
required a hearing prior to termination," and then, after deciding
that a prior hearing was required, addressed itself to the constitutional minimums for that prior hearing.70 It should be noted that
the Supreme Court raised the "law-fact" distinction not in the section
of its opinion addressed to whether a pre-termination hearing was
required, but rather in the section concerned with what were the
due process minimums of that prior hearing. Since the Kelly case
involved terminations contested only on factual grounds, it was
natural that the Court, in fashioning the minimum requirements
for a pre-termination hearing, would be concerned with safeguarding
resolution of factual disputes rather than strictly legal questions.
Read in this light, the qualifying language of footnote 15 of the Kelly
opinion can be viewed as deferring resolution of what type of prior
hearing is required where only legal issues are involved rather
than deferring resolution of whether a prior hearing is required
where only legal issues are involved. 71
More importantly, it is difficult to comport the "law-fact" distinction drawn in Merriweather with the rationale articulated by
the Supreme Court in Kelly. The Supreme Court based its requirement of a prior hearing on the basis that the recipients' interests
in continued benefits outweighed any governmental interests of economic or administrative burdens involved in continuation of the
benefits.7 2 It is difficult to discern how the interests of the recipient
or the state would change because the recipient attacked the legal
basis for his termination rather than the factual basis. If a recipient
has a "brutal need" for continued benefits in order to maintain
minimum levels of existence, that need remains whether the recipient claims that the statute or the regulation involved is invalid
or claims that the department has made a mistake as to the facts.
As to the state's interests, only two arguments can be advanced
to distinguish the interests involved in cases raising factual disputes
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
397
Id.
See
See

at 12071.
U.S. at 260-66 (Part I).
at 266-71 (Part II).
FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 275-77 (1949).
footnotes 35 through 40, mtpra, and accompanying text.
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from those involved in cases raising legal issues: (1) That there
should be some presumption of correctness or regularity applied
to statutory or regulatory provisions that is not applied to factual
decisions made by administrative personnel; and (2) that the extension of the prior-hearing requirement to cases involving strictly
legal issues would add such a great incremental administrative
and economic burden on the state as to shift the balance of interests
from the recipient to the state. Neither of these arguments withstands close scrutiny.
First, as to any presumption of correctness, it is clear that the
discernible evidence and experience in this area of the law belies
any such presumption. The large number of cases now being litigated
attacking statutory and regulatory provisions, and the remarkable
incidence of success in these cases, 7 3 demonstrates that there are
gross imperfections in the statutory and regulatory schemes regarding welfare programs. Indeed, in one state, statistics disclose that
the statutory or regulatory provisions attacked have been upheld in
only about one half the cases decided by the administrative agency's
own hearing board.7 4 In these circumstances, to adopt a presumption
of correctness or regularity as to statutory or regulatory
provisions, a court would have to blind itself to reality.
The second argument advanced to distinguish cases involving
legal issues from cases involving factual issues, appears to be foreclosed by the Kelly decision itself. In Kelly, the Court did not
find that there were no administrative or economic burdens attendant
to requiring a pre-termination hearing or that such burdens were
minimal. 75 Rather, the Court appeared to be saying, without factual
inquiry into the extent of these burdens, that these interests were
not of a quality to offset the recipients' interests in continued benefits. Moreover, there is no evidence that the extention of the pretermination hearing requirement to cases involving strictly legal
issues would effect a substantial increase in the economic or administrative burdens on the state. On the contrary, there is some
evidence that the number of disputes involving strictly legal issues
73. In the cases to which the Supreme Court has addressed itself, concerning attacks
on welfare statutes and regulations, there have been only two cases in which the attack
has not been successful. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471 (1970) and Snell
v. Wyman, 393 U.S. 323 (1969) affirming 281 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) with Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) ; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 897 (1970) ; Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970-) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 264 (1970) ; Wyman v. Bowens, 397
U.S. 49 (1970), afftrming 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Shapiro v. Solmon, 396
U.S. 5 (1969), affirming 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn. 1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 894
U.S. 618 (1969) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). As this artidfe went to press, the
Supreme 'Court upheld a New York State welfare regulation requiring income assistance
recipients to submit to home visits by agency officials. Wyman v. James, -vs.-,
39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (January 12, 1971).
74. See Affidavit of Counsel Accompanying Memorandum in Support of Temporary
Restraining Order in Provost v. Betit, Civ. No. 6091 (). Vt., complaint filed Nov. 9, 1970).
75. Compare Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afI'd sub norn. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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constitutes a small percentage of the total number of disputed welfare terminations. 8
Finally, any distinction in the application of the pre-termination
hearing requirement drawn on whether the cases involve questions
of law or fact would be extremely difficult to administer. Many
disputes which on their face appear to raise only questions of law
also involve factual issues. Indeed, even where the recipient attacks
only the statutory or regulatory provision under which his assistance
was terminated, not disputing the application of the facts of his
situation to the provision involved, the underlying dispute may be
a factual one. Many regulations involved in the administration of
income assistance programs are based on findings that the administrative agency has made from evidential or experiential fact and
has then turned into regulation.7 7 Often, when attacks are made
on these types of regulations, the attack on the legal validity of
the regulation is an attack on the validity of the underlying factual
assumptions."
The above considerations indicate that no meaningful distinction
may be drawn between those cases involving factual issues and
those cases involving strictly legal issues. As such, the failure to
apply the pre-termination hearing requirement to cases involving
strictly legal issues would be out of harmony with the spirit of Kelly.
It may be that where the recipient attacks the termination of his
assistance on the ground of the invalidity of the statutory or regulatory provision involved, the courts will fashion different constitutional minimums for that pre-termination hearing. However, considering that many such legal attacks involve underlying factual disputes, it would appear the constitutional minimums in this type of
case should be at least as stringent as the ones adopted in Kelly.
2. Absence of "Brutal Need". While it appears that the pretermination hearing requirement is applicable to termination contested on strictly legal grounds, as well as those contested on factual
grounds, the question remains whether a hearing prior to termination
is required in cases where it is clear that there is no "brutal need"
for continued payments in order to maintain minimum levels of
existence. Illustrative of this type of situation is the case of McCall
79
v. Shapiro.
The plaintiff in McCall was receiving AFDC benefits from the
Connecticut Department of Welfare for herself and her two minor
children. One of the children (Georgianna) was determined by the
Social Security Administration to be eligible for benefits under the
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Affidavit, supra note 74.
See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
Id.
292 F. Supp. 268 (D.Conn. 1968), aff'd 416 F.2d 246 (2d.

ir. 1969).
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federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance program
(OASDI) .80 Since Georgianna had been determined eligible as of September 1967, but had not been receiving benefits until June 1968, the
Soc,.al Security Administration, in June, sent to Mrs. McCall, as representative payee for Georgianna, a retroactive lump-sum payment,
reflecting benefits accrued but not paid from September 1967 through
May 1968. The Connecticut Welfare Department demanded of Mrs.
McCall that she turn over to them the retroactive OASDI payment
as reimbursement for the AFDC assistance given Georgianna for
the months covered by the retroactive payment. When Mrs. McCall
refused to turn over the check, the department notified her that the
AFDC assistance for herself and her two daughters would be terminated until the benefits withheld equalled the amount of the OASDI
retroactive payment claimed by the department. After that, the
AFDC payments would be resumed. In accordance with existing
regulations, Mrs. McCall's assistance was then terminated without
first affording her a hearing. After the termination, Mrs. McCall
brought suit in United States District Court asserting that the termination of her AFDC assistance prior to affording her an opportunity
to be heard violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is clear from the facts of the situation presented in McCall
that the welfare agency's termination did not effect a diminution
of Mrs. McCall's level of income which pre-existed the payment of
the retroactive OASDI payment. The termination was limited in time
until the income reflected by the OASDI payment would be exhausted,
calculated on the amount of income assistance previously supplied
by the monthly AFDC grants. Viewed in this light, it is clear that
the "brutal need" for continued payments, relied on by the Supreme
Court in Kelly, was not present in this case. As the District court
noted:
As always, in reaching the crucial issue, it is important
to determine what is not involved. It is an overstatement of
the case to state simply that the AFDC payments were terminated without a prior hearing. The stance taken by the
parties in their dispute over the right to possession of the
OASDI payment in behalf of Georgianna tends to distort the
issue. The form of the statement by the plaintiff is not controlling. The substance of her case is that upon informing
the Welfare Department of her possession of the check as
representative payee for Georgianna and her refusal to turn
it over to the Welfare Department at its request, the Commissioner determined that so long as the $334.10 was available
to her to provide for the needs of herself and family at the
pre-determined rate of assistance benefits, such benefits
80. 42 U.S.C. §j 401 et aeq. (1.64).
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would be withheld. From her standpoint, if she had turned
the check over to the possession of the Welfare Department,
as requested, there would have been no suspension in the
payments of welfare assistance for her and her children.
Viewed in this context, without passing on the merits of the
substantive question, the most that was at stake was who was
entitled to possession of the OASDI check pending resolution
of the question whether it was available for use as assistance
for the family.8 1
After thus defining the interest of the recipient in this case,
the court had little difficulty in holding that due process did not
require a hearing prior to this termination:
Considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the
case at hand, the argument that the action of the Commissioner in temporarily suspending welfare assistance payments
imposed such an irremediable hardship upon [Mrs. McCall]
as to make the delay in the hearing so unfair as to be unconstitutional seems artificial.
She was far from being hopelessly compromised in an intolerable position. By relinquishing possession of the OASDI
check, the core question of whether she was entitled to retain
the funds for Georgianna's present and future needs 2remained
open for determination under adequate safeguards.
It should be noted that the decision in McCall was rendered
before the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly. The question remains, therefore, whether the Kelly case commands a change
in result in the McCall situation. It is difficult to perceive how the
Kelly decision could command such a change. The district court
in McCall approached the issue in the same manner as the Supreme
Court did in Kelly. Both courts first sought to identify the interests
of the parties involved and then to balance interests of the recipient
against the interests of the state. The difference in results in the
two cases, therefore, does not result from a difference in approach
or standards applied, or from the courts' striking a different balance between identical interests. Rather, the difference results from
the fact that the interests of the recipients in the two cases were
not identical and were in fact so greatly dissimilar as to require a
different striking of the balance. The Supreme Court in Kelly, noting
that the termination of assistance left the recipient without his basic
source of income, identified the interest as the "brutal need" for
survival. On the other hand, the district court in McCall, noting
that the termination did not affect the recipient's pre-existing level
of income, identified the interest involved as merely that of "posses81.
82.

292 F. Supp. at 272.
Id. at 273-274 (footnotes omitted).
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sion of the OASDI check pending resolution of the question whether
it was available for use as assistance for the family." 83
Viewed in this light, the McCall case may be read as defining
the extent to which the pre-termination hearing requirement articulated in Kelly will be applied. Where the termination effects an
elimination of the basic source of income of the recipient, his interest
in continued payments in order to survive requires that there be
a hearing prior to termination. Where, however, it is uncontested
that the termination will not affect the pre-existing income of the
recipient, then there can be no claim that the recipient's interest
in continued payments is an interest in continuing the means of
survival. In such situations, the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly
cannot be considered to compel a prior hearing, and if such a requirement is to be found in the Due Process Clause, the recipient must
come forward with some other compelling interest.
B. Reductions of Assistance
Although the holding of the Supreme Court in Kelly dealt only
with terminations of income assistance benefits, the Court did not
make an effort to distinguish between termination of benefits and
reduction of benefits. There was no indication in Kelly that the same
considerations would not apply to reductions. In a subsequent case,
however, the Court expressly limited the effect of its holding in
Kelly to terminations and suspensions. In Daniel v. Goliday,8" the
plaintiffs had been receiving income assistance benefits pursuant
to programs administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.
Some of the plaintiffs had their assistance terminated and some
had their assistance reduced, all without being afforded prior hearings. Upon bringing suit, a federal district court held that the reductions as well as the terminations were violative of due process
where no prior hearings were afforded. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded,
stating:
This Court's . . . decisions in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . and

Wheeler v. Montgomery . . . dealt only with termination and
suspension, not reduction, of benefits. We think that the bearing of those decisions on the treatment of benefit reductions
should be determined in the first instance by the District Court
on a record developed by the parties with specific attention
to that issue. 83
The Court did not attempt, however, to articulate in what way
the record before it was deficient; nor did it articulate any guidance
33.
34.
35.

292 F. Supp. at 272.
398 U.S. 73 (1970). vacating 30§ F. Supp. 1224 (N.D.IU. 1969).
Id.
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for the lower court or the parties as to what factors would be important in creating a complete record. 86
The Supreme Court's per curiam treatment in Goliday is troubling
in its ambiguity. From the Court's brief statement, it is unclear
whether the Court considered the record as presented deficient in
facts addressed to the interests of the parties the Court considered
important in Kelly, or, whether the Court felt that interests other than
those considered in Kelly may be relevant where assistance benefits
are reduced rather than terminated. What is especially troubling in
Goliday is the Court's manifested concern for the record, considering
the almost total absence of factual exposition or analysis in the Kelly
decision. 87
A comparison of the decisions of the district courts in both Kelly
and Goliday reflect that there is little substantial difference between
the courts' inquiry and development of the facts. s In both decisions,
the courts addressed themselves to the economic and administrative
burdens on the state attendant to the imposition of a prior hearing
requirement; both courts also investigated the burdens on the recipients caused by the actions of the respective agencies. The Kelly
court went into an extended factual exposition of the effect of the
terminations on the individual recipients. s9 The Goliday court, however, while noting that the reduction of assistance was by about
one half, did not expressly consider whether the reduction of assistance had any substantially different effect on the recipient than
the termination of assistance. Rather, the court only noted that the
action of agency-without differentiating between reduction and termination-affected the recipients' abilities to maintain "a reasonable
sustaining subsistence pending a preliminary determination of
whether the recipient is or continues to be entitled to [assistance] .,'9o
It is possible therefore that what the Supreme Court desired further
development of was the effect on a recipient of a partial withdrawal
of income assistance benefits (reduction) as compared with the
effect of a total withdrawal of such benefits (termination), so that
the Court could determine whether any such difference in effect
would change the interests of the recipient in continued payments.
It is difficult to perceive how any difference in effect between
a termination and a reduction would substantially change the interests of the recipient. The effect of the total withdrawal of income
86. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963)
(Brennan
J., concurring).
87. See footnotes 54 and 55, supra and accompanying text.
88. The decision in Keliy contained more factual exposition of the effects of the termi.
nations on the recipients than was present in Goliday. The court, in Goliday, however,
did note that the effect of the reductions was to put the recipients in the position of trying "to survive without funds for food, shelter and clothing.
305 F. Supp. at 1228.
89. 294 F. Supp. at 899-900.
90. 305 F. Supp. at 1228.
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assistance produced by termination that the Court in Kelly considered important was that such withdrawal left the recipient without
means to survive, thus turning his attention from seeking redress
of his grievance with the welfare agency to finding means for subsistence. 9' Since a welfare recipient, by definition, is a person whose
92
income is limited to providing only a minimum level of subsistence,
it is clear that any subtraction from that income-whether a total
or partial withdrawal-is going to leave the recipient without sufficient
means to sustain a minimum level of existence. Such was the reasoning of the district court in Merriweather v. Burson,93 in holding
that due process required a hearing prior to reductions as well as
terminations of assistance:
In ruling that states may not terminate benefits without
such a hearing, the United States Supreme Court held that
'the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of
aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits.' . ..
The same result may arise from a substantial reduction of
benefits. It, too, may so shift the recipient's central concern
to finding means for daily subsistence, that it undercuts his
ability to seek redress from the welfare administration ...
Accordingly, there is no distinction between reduction and
termination of public assistance substantial enough to warrant
differentiation here .... 9
This conclusion is further supported when one compares the
reduction of assistance with the termination of assistance in the
context of the recipient's total income. Since not every income assistance recipient relies on the assistance benefit as his sole source
of income, a fortiori, not every termination will effect a total withdrawal of the recipient's means of survival. To the substantial number of recipients for whom income assistance benefits constitute
only a part of their total income, a termination of assistance, like a
reduction of assistance, will cause only a partial withdrawal of funds.
Thus, as to this class of recipients, there is no distinction between
a termination and a reduction of assistance benefits. 95 Yet, the
Supreme Court, in Kelly, did not distinguish between those recipients
91. 897 U.S. at 264.
92. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93. CCH Pov. L. Rep. fl 11,386 (N.D.Ga. 1970).
94. Id. at 12,071 (emphasis in the original).
95. It cannot be claimed, even, that termination of benefits will always work a greater
reduction of income than reduction of benefits will. Thus, compare the situations where
one recipient has a total income of $250 a month, of which $100 is income assistance
benefits, with the situation where a recipient whose total income of $250 a month is derived solely from income assistance benefits. If the first recipient has his benefits term4nated, this will reduce his income by $100 a month. If the second recipient has his benefits reduced by one half, this will reduce his income by $125 a month-a greater loss than
the "terminated" recipient. It should be noted that nowhere in the Kelly opinion did the
Supreme Court seek to distinguish among the terminations involved in that case on the
basis of the dollar amount of benefits lost.
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whose assistance benefits constituted their total income and those
recipients whose assistance benefits constituted only a part of their
total income. Indeed, it is clear that at least one of the recipients
in Kelly had income other than the assistance benefit. 9 Since the
Court did not seek to distinguish between the situations where termination effected a total withdrawal of income and the situations
where termination effected only a reduction of income, it would seem
clear that, for the Court, the important consideration was not how
much income was withdrawn, but the fact that the income withdrawn
reduced the recipient to a state where he did not have sufficient
means to maintain a minimum level of subsistence. Therefore, it
would seem clear that the prior hearing requirement in Kelly
should apply to reductions as well as terminations of assistance
benefits, so long as they effect a dimunition of the income of the
recipient.
C. Other Assistance Programs
Perhaps, the most significant question left open by the Supreme
Court in Kelly is whether hearings prior to terminations must
be afforded recipients of governmental assistance programs other
than income assistance. The Supreme Court did not address itself
to that question in Kelly, although the Court's reliance97 on the
recent decision of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 98 indicates
that the prior hearing requirement would extend to other governmental benefit programs as Well.
Sniadach involved the attempted garnishment of wages by a
creditor of the employee. Under the existing procedures of the state
involved, 99 a creditor, in order to attach and "freeze" the wages
of a putative debtor needed only to secure a summons from the
clerk of court and serve it on the employer. Once served, the employer was required to withhold the Wages of the employee, 100 and
the employee could get the wages "unfrozen" only at the trial
of the main suit. The employee in Sniadach attacked the garnishment
procedures employed as a violation of due process, since they did
not afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
attachment. In holding that the garnishment procedures violated
due process, the Court approached the problem in a manner analogous
to the approach it would subsequently use in Kelly.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, first noted that "wages
[are] a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
96. 294. F. Supp. at 899.
97. 397 U.S. at 264, 267.
98. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
99. See WIS. STAT. § 269.04 (1).
100. The statutory scheme allows for a "subsistence" exemption, free from attachment.
See Wis. STAT. § 267.18 (2) (a).
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in our economic system."1'0 The special significance of wages in
Justice Douglas' opinion is that they are the means by which the
wage earner provides subsistence to himself and his family.1 02 As
such, "prejudgment garnishment ... is a taking which may impose
tremendous hardship on wage-earners with families to support."'0 8
Noting that the "subsistence" exemption in the garnishment statute
was insufficient to support a wage earner for a week, Douglas
went on:
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin
type may as a practical matter drive the wage-earning family
to the wall. . . . [This prejudgment garnishment procedure
violates the fundamental principles of due process?"
While the Court's opinion in Sniadach does not explicitly follow
the same approach as the Court's opinion in Kelly, it is clear that
in both cases, the Court was primarily concerned with the fact that
the procedures involved summarily deprived the person of the basic
means of survival. As such, Kelly, read with Sniadach, strongly indicates that the prior-hearing requirement does not turn on the source
of the income involved, but rather whether the resultant loss of
that income will deprive the person of the ability to maintain a
minimum level of subsistence. This reading of the two cases appears
to be supported by the experience of the lower federal and state
courts in their application of the principles to a new situation. Thus,
where the courts have been satisfied that the property involved,
whatever its source, was necessary for maintenance of subsistence,
they have generally required a prior hearing. 05 Where, however,
the courts have determined that the property is not necessary to
provide minimum level of subsistence, they have distinguished Kelly
and Sniadach and have held the summary procedures not constitutionally imperfect.1 0
The application of the pre-termination hearing requirement to programs other than income assistance turns, then, on whether the
assistance provided is necessary to maintain a minimum level of
subsistence. Pursuant to such an analysis, it would appear that the
pre-termination hearing requirement would apply to other governmental assistance programs. No one seriously contends anymore
that public assistance programs, whether they provide outright money,
or goods and services, are designed to provide the recipient with
101. 395 U.S. at 840.
102. Id. at 340, 342 n. 9.
103. Id. at 840.
104. Id. at 841-342.
105. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Harder, CCH Pov. L. Rep. 1 12,048 D. 'Conn. 1970) ; Java v.
Calif. Dep't. of Human Resources Development, CCH Pov. L. Rep. 1 11,656 (N.D.Cal.).
prob. Jurls. noted, 39 U.S.L.TW. 3179 (Oct. 26, 1970).
106. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., CCH Pov. L. Rep. 1 11,934 (10 CIr.
1970) ; Lawson v. Mantell, CCH Pov. L. Rep. 2 11,610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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more than the basic necessities for survival. 107 Housing, food, medical
care, as well as cash, are all necessities, the deprivation of any
one of which will deprive the person, with no other resources or
alternatives, of the basic means for survival. Furthermore, the
"needs" requirements to be eligible for these programs insure that
the recipients will have no other resources or alternatives.10 8
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Goldberg v. Kelly, rather than setting to rest
a troubling area of the law, is just the beginning. The problems with
which the lower federal and state courts are now grappling will
eventually find their way to the Supreme Court and give the Court
an opportunity to fashion definable standards and limitations to the
rule first announced in Kelly and Sniadach.
While this article, in attempting to isolate and identify the irelevant issues and considerations, has necessarily concentrated on somewhat sterile legal abstractions, it is of primary importance to be
constantly aware that in these situations, we are dealing with problems arising between the government and a class of its citizens.
While it is always necessary for the government to act in a manner
that is fair and non-arbitrary, it is especially important when the
government action affects the poor. This is for two reasons. First,
adverse governmental action will necessarily have a magnified effect
on the poor since they rely to such a great extent on the government
for their day-to-day existence. Second, the poor are particularly
vulnerable to arbitrary governmental action, since they inherently
lack the resources to guard against and resist such arbitrariness.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the Supreme Court decision
in Kelly is an incipient awareness of the conditions of poverty and
its attendant effects on the ability of the poor to protect themselves.
From this awareness, it appears that the Court may be willing
to fashion different rules and procedures to attempt to redress this
imbalance of power. For the Court to do this and to articulate
this with clarity and precision would certainly be salutory.
To a great extent, the poor in this country are the dispossessed
and the alienated. For them, the "Great American Dream" has not
worked and does not appear to be working. They, therefore, have
less reason for commitment to our institutions and way of life.
Their "last chance"-as it is with all citizens-is in the courts. The
sensitivity of the courts to their needs and problems and the creativity
107.
108.

12,243 (D.Conn. 1970).
Cf. McClellan v. Shapiro, CCH Pov. L. Rep.
Cf. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) afI'd, 393 U.S. 323 (1969).
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of the courts in fashioning responses to those problems may be a
vital factor in the continued existence of our present society.109

109. "From alienated and dispossessed there comes an increasing insistance that the
formal guarantees of fairness are primary, and there is a growing willingness to insist
upon these guarantees militantly and even disruptively. In such a time, to speak of accommodation of order to Justice becomes more and more beside the point, for in the real
world they are more and more perceived in counterposition." Tigar, The Supreme Court
1969 Term, Forward: Watver of Conatitutiona Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 H]Av.
L. Ruv. 1, 28 (1970).

